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CONTRASTIVE MARKED EXCLUSIVE FOCUS 
PARTICLES IN JAPANESE: A CASE OF DAKE-WA 
1 INTRODUCTION 
This paper deals with the interpretations of Japanese dake-wa ‘only-Contrastive 
Topic.’ Dake brings about exhaustification in general, but the domain of 
exhaustification cannot be captured in a straightforward way. In particular, dake used 
with contrastive-marking wa makes it unclear about over which part the particle 
exhaustifies, because contrastive wa generates a conventional implicature itself. In 
other words, when dake interacts with contrastive wa, it is hard to determine how they 
semantically contribute to the sentence. Hara (2007) analyzes the meaning of dake-wa 
and claims that when dake is used in a contrastive-marked sentence, it exhaustifies 
over some meaning level that is higher than the propositional one, and that there is the 
implicature that no follow-up information is available about any other individual 
regarding the question under discussion. I argue that Hara (2007)’s analysis of the 
complex particle cannot be extended to the cases where it is used in modalized 
sentences. When dake-wa is used in modal sentences, it is possible for the following 
sentence to mention the speaker’s knowledge of any other individual with respect to 
the question under discussion. In short, dake-wa in modal sentences behaves 
differently than in indicative sentences. The meaning of dake-wa is greatly affected by 
the presence of modals. Considering the particle’s interaction with modal expressions, 
Hara (2007)’s semantics of dake-wa is not enough to fully capture its interpretation. 
This paper is organized as follows: Section 2 introduces Hara (2007)’s analysis of 
dake-wa. In section 3, I apply Hara (2007)’s semantics of dake-wa to modal sentences 
and illustrate that it does not correctly give rise to the meaning of dake-wa in modal 
sentences. This section also presents some observations about dake-wa in modal 
sentences as well. In non-modal sentences, only when dake is absent, is the following 
sentence compatible when it mentions the alternatives about the question under 
discussion. This contrast cannot be observed in modal sentences (Section 3.2). It is 
also noteworthy that dake-wa interacts with the epistemicity flow. The following 
sentence exhibits lower epistemicity than the first one (Section 3.3). This leads me to 
opine that capturing the semantics of dake requires the consideration of not only the 
contrastive-markedness but also the modal of the sentence. Section 4 gives a 
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conclusion to this paper. 
2 HARA (2007)’S ANALYSIS OF DAKE-WA 
Hara (2007) argues that dake in dake-wa sentences does not apply to a propositional 
level, but to a higher level than that. The motivation for this claim is that if we take 
wa in dake-wa sentences as a contrastive topic, which induces the conventional 
implicature, it cannot be compatible with the semantics of dake with an exclusive 
implicature at a propositional level. 
In the literature, wa in Japanese has two uses: topic wa and contrastive wa. 
According to Kuno (1973), Japanese contrastive wa is distinguished from topic one in 
that it has a prosodic peak in its intonation.1 Hara (2005) argues that the prosodic 
peak of contrastive-marking divides the asserted proposition into B (background) and 
F (Focus) under the structured meaning theory of focus. Wa then introduces CON 
operator, which takes the structured meaning as its argument and produces a 
conventional implicature. In a contrastive-marked sentence, the presence of a stronger 
alternative to the asserted proposition is presupposed, and it is conventionally 
implicated that the speaker considers the possibility that the stronger alternative is 
false, as in (1). Hara (2005, 2007) provides the semantics of Japanese 
contrastive-marker wa, indicated as follows:  
(1) Let F be the focus-marked elements, B the background, R the restriction. 
 The interpretation of CON (B)(F): 
a. asserts: (B)(F) 
b. presupposes: F’[[F’R]&[B(F’) B(F)]&[B(F)B(F’)]] 
c. implicates: ◇(¬(B(F’)))   
                                                       (Hara 2007: 219) 
 
With this semantics applied, the contrastive-marked sentence is interpreted as follows: 
(2) JOHN-wa  kita. 
JOHN-CON came. 
‘John came.’ 
 a. B=λx. x came. F=John F’=John and Mary 
 b. assertion: John came. 
  c. implicates: the speaker considers the possibility that ‘John and Mary  
came’ is false. 
 d. assertion + implicature: the speaker considers the possibility that ‘Mary 
came’ is false. 
(Hara 2007: 219, 220) 
 
                                                          
1 This paper does not deal with a prosodic peak in intonation in detail. See Kuno (1973) for more details.  
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Unfortunately, Hara (2007) argues that this semantics of the contrastive-marked 
sentence cannot successfully interpret the sentence that includes exhaustive particle 
dake. Consider (3) and two possible computations for the sentence: 
(3) JOHN-dake-wa  kita. 
JOHN-only-CON came. 
‘Only John came.’  
(Hara 2007: 220) 
(4) First option: F= John  F’= John and Mary 
a. B=λx. Only x came. 
b. asserts: ‘Only John came.’  
c. implicature: the speaker considers the possibility that it is not the case 
that only John and Mary came.  
(Hara 2007: 220) 
(5) Second option: F= only John 
a. B=λx. x came. F= only John 
b. No implicature possible (presupposition failure)  
(Hara 2007: 220) 
The first option yields an unavailable implicature, as shown in (4). The second option 
does not help, either. If ‘John’ is replaced by ‘only John’ as the focused element, it 
results in the presupposition failure, because John-dake-ga kita ‘Only John came’ 
entails ‘no one other than John came.’ 
In order to solve this puzzle, Hara (2007) adopts the analysis of dake by 
Yoshimura (2005) in that dake is an expressive item that creates a conventional 
implicature, and it asserts the prejacent proposition and entails the exceptive 
meaning.2 In other words, the exhaustive meaning of dake contributes to a meaning 
level that is different from the prejacent proposition: 
(6) JOHN-dake-ga   kita. 
JOHN-only-NOM  came. 
a. assertion: John came. 
b. conventional implicature: No one else came.  
(Hara 2007: 223) 
What the exhaustification in the conventional implicature is applied to is 
dependent on whether the sentence is contrastive-marked or not. When the sentence is 
not contrastive-marked, as in (6), dake takes the prejacent proposition as its argument 
and produces the exceptive meaning as a conventional implicature by negating all the 
alternative propositions. In other words, dake exhaustifies over the proposition. When 
the sentence is contrastive-marked, on the other hand, dake exhaustifies over potential 
literal acts of assertion in the sense of Siegel (2006). Siegel (2006:170) defines it as in 
                                                          





(7) [Potential literal acts] are abstract objects consisting only of propositional 
content and whatever illocutionary force potential can be read directly from 
their morphosyntactic form, not necessarily the actual illocutionary act that 
might be performed. 
(Siegel 2006: 170) 
Siegel (2006) explains that potential literal acts are not the actually performed acts. 
They do not specify the contextual variables of the actual speech acts such as speaker 
and addressee, among others. The variables of the potential literal acts like assertions, 
questions, and commands, among others, are introduced by a context-sensitive 
meaning-shift rule.3 
Hara (2007) defines the semantics of dake in the contrastive-marked sentence as 
an exhaustification over potential literal acts of assertion. Dake-wa sentences 
implicate that the asserted proposition is the only assertion that the speaker produces 
with respect to the question under discussion. Since both contrastive-marker wa and 
dake induce conventional implicatures, the two implicatures are generated 
independently. After a context-sensitive meaning-shift rule mentioned in note 3 is 
applied, the conventional implicature denoted by dake negates the produced 
alternatives as in (8). ‘Assertion(B(F))’ means ‘a is an assertion of p ^ p = B(F).’ 
(8)  a' [[a'  Alt (assertion (B (F))) & a'  assertion (B (F)) ]  ¬ a']  
(Hara 2007: 229) 
The interpretation of dake in a contrastive-marked sentence is summarized in (9). 
(9) The interpretation of dake(B)(F) in a contrastive-marked sentence: 
Let F be the focus-marked elements, B the background 
a. assertion: B(F) 
   b. implication: There is no assertion of individuals other than F with  
respect to the question B. 
(Hara 2007: 229) 
 
The example in (3), repeated here as (10), is now analyzed as follows: 
(10) JOHN-dake-wa  kita. 
JOHN-only-CON came 
                                                          
3 [a context-sensitive meaning-shift rule] If B is a sentence of English with the morphosyntactic shape of 
an assertion and ^β is its translation, then a is an assertion of p ∧ p = ^β, is also a possible translation of 
B, where a varies over assertions, p varies over propositions, and is an assertion of is the relation between 
assertions and propositions such that if x is an assertion of y, then y is the propositional component of x.  
Siegel (2006:191) 
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‘Only John came.’  
(Hara 2007: 220) 
 
(11) a. potential literal act: 
  α is an assertion of p  p＝came(John)            
b. focus-marking on John generates an alternative potential literal act: 
  α' is an assertion of p'  p'＝came(Mary)  
(Hara 2007: 228) 
 
(12) a. B=λx.x came. F=John 
b. assertion: John came.  
c.conventional implicature 1, CON(B)(F): The speaker considers the 
possibility that 'Mary came' is false. 
d.conventional implicature 2, dake(B)(F): There is no assertion of Mary 
with respect to the question λx. x came.  
(Hara 2007: 229) 
Since dake-wa brings about the implicature “There is no assertion about Mary with 
respect to the question “λx. x came,” any continuation that asserts the speaker’s 
knowledge concerning any other individual about the question being discussed is 
incompatible. 
(13) a.  Did John and Mary come? 
b. #JOHN-dake-wa kita.  Mary-mo  kita-kamoshirenai. 
     John-dake-CON came. Mary-too came-might. 
   ‘At least John came. Mary might have come, too.’  
(Hara 2007: 229) 
 
This section showed that Hara (2007)’s analysis solves the paradox produced by the 
combination of dake and contrastive wa. In the next section, I apply this proposed 
semantics of dake-wa to modal contexts, and show that the analysis gives a wrong 
prediction for these types of sentences. 
3 DAKE-WA USED WITH MODALS 
3.1 ‘Dake-wa’ in Modal Sentences 
In this subsection, I will apply Hara (2007)’s proposal of the semantics of dake-wa to 
modal sentences and argue that the interpretation derived from the application of Hara 
(2007)’s semantics fails to capture the meaning of dake-wa in these sentences. 
Japanese has epistemic modal elements such as darou ‘will,’ hazuda ‘should,’ 
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kamoshirenai ‘might,’ and nitigainai ‘must.’ Consider (14), for example. 
(14) JOHN-dake-wa kuru-darou. 
John-only-CON  come-will. 
‘At least John will come.’  
When Hara (2007)’s semantics of dake-wa is applied, we would get (15) as its 
assertion and implicature. 
(15) JOHN-dake-wa kuru-darou. 
a. B=λx.x will come. F=John 
b. assertion: John will come. 
c. conventional implicature 1, CON(B)(F): 
 the speaker considers the possibility that 'Mary will come' is false. 
d. conventional implicature 2, dake(B)(F): 
 there is no assertion of Mary with respect to the question λx. x will 
come. 
 
In (15), dake generates the conventional implicature “there is no assertion about Mary 
with respect to the question “λx. x will come.” As a result, it is predicted that any 
continuation is infelicitous that asserts the speaker’s knowledge about any other 
individual with respect to the question under discussion “λx. x will come.” The 
following sentence is acceptable, contrary to this prediction. 
(16) [Context]There will be a lecture held at the university tomorrow. 
Unfortunately, the title sounds boring and it even costs a lot to join. 
Professors are worried about no student showing up.  
a. Will students come tomorrow? 
b. JOHN-dake-wa kuru-darou. Mary-mo kuru-kamoshirenai. 
  John-only-CON  come-will.  Mary-too come-might. 
  ‘At least John will come. Mary might come, too.’ 
What should be noticed in this sentence is that there comes a continuous information 
about Mary following the dake-wa sentence. The sentence provides information about 
an individual other than John with respect to the question under discussion: that is, 
“λx. x will come.” In other words, Hara (2007)’s semantics of dake-wa cannot give 
rise to the right prediction regarding dake-wa in modal sentences. The acceptability of 
the following sentences (17) and (18) points to the same effect. The context is 
assumed to be the same as that in (16). 
(17) JOHN-dake-wa kuru-hazuda. Mary-mo kuru-kamoshirenai-ga. 
 John-only-CON  come-should.  Mary-too come-might. 
‘At least John should come. Mary might come, too.’ 
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(18) JOHN-dake-wa kuru-nitigainai. Mary-mo kuru-kamoshirenai-ga. 
 John-only-CON  come-must.   Mary-too come-might. 
‘At least John must come. Mary might come, too.’ 
In this subsection, I applied Hara (2007)’s semantics of dake-wa to modal sentences 
and found that Hara (2007)’s proposal is not directly applicable to modal sentences. If 
Hara (2007)’s analysis is correct, then dake-wa exhaustifies over a potential literal act 
even in modal sentences, which is inconsistent with the result. In fact, when dake-wa 
is used in modal sentences, there can be a continuous information about any other 
individual regarding the question under discussion, which is contrary to the prediction 
derived from Hara (2007)’s application. 
3.2 ‘Wa’ vs ‘Dake-Wa’ in Modal Contexts 
Hara (2007) argues that there is a contrast about acceptability depending on the 
presence or absence of dake, as shown in (19), where (13) is repeated as (19). When 
dake is present, any continuation that mentions the speaker’s knowledge about any 
other individual about the question under discussion is impossible, whereas it is 
possible when dake is absent. Consider (19). 
(19) a. Did John and Mary come? 
  #JOHN-dake-wa kita. Mary-mo kita-kamoshirenai. 
   John-dake-CON came. Mary-too came-might. 
 ‘At least John came. Mary might have come, too.’ 
b. Did John and Mary come? 
  JOHN-wa kita.  Mary-mo kita-kamoshirenai. 
John-CON came.  Mary-Add came-might. 
‘At least John came. Mary might have come, too.’  
(Hara 2007: 229) 
Hara (2007) argues that Futagi (2004) originally notes this contrast, as illustrated in 
(20). 
(20) a. #Taro-wa EEGO-dake-wa  hanas-e-ru     ga FURANSUGO-wa 
    Taro-Top English-dake-Con speak-can-Pres but French-Con  
   hanas-e-nai 
   speak-can-Neg 
‘English is the only language Taro can speak, but he cannot speak  
French.’ 
b. Taro-wa EEGO-wa hanas-e-ru    ga FURANSUGO-wa 
   Taro-Top English-Con speak-can-Pres but French-Con  
   hanas-e-nai. 
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   speak-can-Neg 
   ‘Taro can speak English, but he cannot speak French.’ 
(Futagi 2004: 158) 
Regarding modal sentences, however, this contrast cannot be observed. Take (21) for 
instance.  
(21) a. Taro-wa  EEGO-dake-wa  hanas-e-ru-darou ga  FURANSUGO-wa 
Taro-Top English-dake-Con speak-can-will  but French-Con 
hanas-e-nai-darou. 
speak-can-Neg-will. 
‘Taro will be able to speak at least English, but he will not be able to   
speak French.’ 
b. Taro-wa EEGO-wa  hanas-e-ru-darou ga  FURANSUGO-wa 
Taro-Top English-Con speak-can-will  but French-Con 
hanas-e-nai-darou. 
  speak-can-Neg-will. 
‘Taro will be able to speak English, but he will not be able to speak  
French.’ 
Both sentences can be followed by the continuous information about the alternatives 
with respect to the question under discussion. The following pairs also include 
modals; however, they do not show the contrast either. 
(22) a. John-wa  biiru-dake-wa nomu-darou ga  wain-wa  noma-nai-darou. 
 John-Top beer-dake-Con  drink-will   but wine-Con drink-Neg-will. 
  ‘John will drink at least beer, but he will not drink wine.’ 
b. John-wa biiru-wa  nomu-darou ga  wain-wa  noma-nai-darou. 
  John-Top beer-Con drink-will   but wine-Con drink-Neg-will. 
‘John will drink beer, but he will not drink wine.’ 
(23) a. John-wa  gakkai-ni-dake-wa    kuru-darou ga  konsinkai-niwa 
John-Top meeting-Dat-dake-Con come-will  but after-party-Dat 
ko-nai-darou. 
come-Neg-will. 
‘John will at least come to the meeting, but he will not come to the 
after-party.’ 
b. John-wa  gakkai-ni-wa    kuru-darou ga  konsinkai-niwa 
  John-Top meeting-Dat-Con come-will but after-party-Dat 
  ko-nai-darou 
  come-Neg-will 
  ‘John will come to the meeting, but he will not come to the after-party.’ 
The sentences (19) - (20) versus (21) - (23) provide the difference between non-modal 
sentences and modal sentences. In non-modal sentences, there is a contrast about the 
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acceptability between the presence and absence of dake. When dake is absent, the 
following sentence that mentions the alternatives about the question under discussion 
is compatible. When dake is present, it is incompatible. In modal sentences, there is 
no such contrast observable. This observation suggests that the implication of 
dake-wa and wa in modal sentences might be similar. If the premise is true, it might 
lead to two possibilities. First, dake-wa’s semantic contributions to modal sentences 
are assumed to be different from those of indicative sentences. For example, dake-wa 
in the interaction with modals may cancel the implicature that there is no assertion 
about any other alternatives regarding question under discussion. Second, it might be 
that dake-wa has two meanings, and the one in modal sentences is different from the 
one in indicative sentences. In either perspective, the interpretation derived from the 
application of Hara (2007)’s semantics does not capture the meaning of dake-wa used 
in modal sentences. 
3.3 The Interaction of ‘Dake-Wa’ with The Epistemicity Flow 
In this subsection, I would like to think about the constraint on the epistemicity flow. 
Hara (2007) argues that dake in the contrastive-marked sentence exhaustifies over a 
potential literal act, but when dake-wa interacts with modals, it seems unclear whether 
dake makes exhaustification at all. Therefore, I need to think about whether the 
contribution of dake-wa in modal sentences is truly exhaustification or not. In fact, I 
would like to say dake-wa in epistemic modal sentences is involved more with the 
certainty of the speaker about the feasibility of the proposition than with 
exhaustification. In order to see if this intuition is correct, I will look at a sequence of 
epistemic modal sentences. As a matter of fact, I will observe that there is an 
interaction between dake-wa and the flow of epistemicity. This means dake-wa is 
highly involved in the speaker’s certainty about the feasibility rather than 
exhaustification. Consider the epistemicity scale. Japanese epistemic modal 
expressions exhibit the following feasibility scale: kamoshirenai ‘might’  darou 
‘will’  hazuda ‘should’  nitigainai ‘must.’ Take (24) and (25) for instance, which is 
the repetition of (17) and (18), respectively. 
(24) John-dake-wa kuru-hazuda. Mary-mo kuru-kamoshirenai-ga. 
John-only-Con come-should. Mary-too come-might. 
‘At least John should come. Mary might come too.’ 
(25) John-dake-wa  kuru-nitigainai. Mary-mo kuru-kamoshirenai-ga.  
John-only-Con come-must.    Mary-too come-might. 
‘At least John must come. Mary might come too.’ 
What is interesting about these sentences is that the additional sentences hold lower 
epistemicity than the first ones. These sentences become unacceptable when the order 
of the modals is in the other way around, which is shown in the sentences in (26). 
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(26)  John-dake-wa  kuru-kamoshirenai.  
 John-only-Con come-might. 
 ‘At least John might come.’ 
a. ?Mary-mo kuru-hazuda-ga. 
   Mary-too come-should. 
   ‘Mary should come too. 
b. ?Mary-mo kuru-nitigainai-ga.  
   Mary-too come-must. 
   ‘Mary must come too.’ 
To sum up, when dake-wa is used in modal sentences, the additional sentences have 
to exhibit lower epistemicity than the first dake-wa sentences. It can be assumed from 
this observation that dake-wa in the first sentence makes it unacceptable for the 
additional sentence to mention the higher certainty of the speaker than the first one. In 
other words, when there are two pieces of information, which vary in the extent of 
certainty, dake-wa has to be included in the more certain one for the speaker. This 
leads me to consider that dake-wa in these sentences does not seem to make 
exhaustification over potential literal act. 
In this section, I indicated that the interpretation of dake-wa interacts with modals. 
Hara (2007) maintains that the semantics of dake in the contrastive-marked sentence 
contributes to the exhaustification over the potential literal act of assertion, which is 
higher than the propositional level. This analysis of dake-wa does not correctly 
predict the interaction of dake-wa with modals. In order to capture the semantics of 
dake, it is not enough to consider whether the sentence is contrastive-marked or not; 
rather, it is also requisite to think about whether it is the modal sentence or indicative 
sentence. When considering the interpretation of dake-wa in modal sentences, we 
have to take into account the contribution of both modal expressions and dake. I will 
leave this for future research. 
4 CONCLUSION 
In this paper, I tested the interpretation and the behavior of dake-wa in modal 
sentences, based on Hara (2007), which analyzes dake-wa in non-modal sentences. 
Hara (2007) maintains that dake used in a contrastive-marked sentence does not 
exhaustify over proposition but over the potential literal act of assertion, in the sense 
of Siegel (2006). Dake in a contrastive-marked sentence generates an implicature that 
there is no assertion about any other individuals with respect to the question under 
discussion. In other words, contrastive-markedness is essential for her analysis. Her 
semantics of dake-wa, however, cannot be extended to modal sentences. It is obvious 
that when dake-wa is used in modal sentences, there can be continuous information 
about any other individual regarding the question under discussion. There is also a 
constraint on the epistemicity flow in that the additional sentences following dake-wa 
sentences have to hold lower epistemicity than the first ones. This means that dake-wa 
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in modal sentences might be involved more with the speaker’s certainty about the 
feasibility of the proposition than with exhaustification. In conclusion, it is explicit 
that dake-wa functions differently in modal sentences than in indicative sentences. If 
dake semantically contributes to the propositional level, then there would be no 
explanation available about the interaction with modals. This supports Hara (2007)’s 
assumption that dake takes scope over higher levels than the propositional levels. 
However, considering contrastive-markedness is not enough to capture the semantic 
contribution of dake, and modal-marking should not be dismissed. This paper did not 
reach to the proposal of the amended semantics of dake-wa. Therefore, I will leave 
this for future research. 
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